We study mechanisms for differential privacy on finite datasets. By deriving sufficient sets for differential privacy we obtain necessary and sufficient conditions for differential privacy, a tight lower bound on the maximal expected error of a discrete mechanism and a characterisation of the optimal mechanism which minimises the maximal expected error within the class of mechanisms considered.
Introduction
Data privacy has been of interest to researchers for decades [5] , but highprofile privacy breaches in recent years, such as those involving AOL [1] and Netflix [16] , have renewed focus on the topic. The movement towards smart metering systems for electricity, water and other utilities and the greater use of data mining in so-called smart cities and transport have given rise to further concerns over personal data privacy.
The most traditional framework for the study of data privacy is that of tabular data. A simple model of this type considers the data to be arranged as individual records within a table, where each record contains entries from some underlying dataset, which may be continuous or discrete depending on the type of data being studied. Simple anonymisation techniques, such as removing names and social security numbers (so-called unique identifiers) from the data, have been shown to be inadequate [17] . More sophisticated frameworks such as k-anonymity [17] and ℓ-diversity [13] are also vulnerable to privacy attacks via the use of appropriate side-information or data from external sources [13, 12] .
Within the last decade, differential privacy [7] has emerged as a popular framework for research in the field of data privacy based on its capability to provide a quantifiable basis for privacy preserving data publishing and mining. This is a probabilistic approach to data privacy in which a suitably randomised version of the correct response to a query is released. The core idea is founded on the simple premise that the response to a user query should not be too tightly coupled with any one entry in the table. One widely-adopted implementation of differential privacy for real-valued databases is to add an appropriate amount of noise sampled from a Laplace distribution to each cell of the database [6] .
Much research on differential privacy to date has been completed on realvalued databases [6] , although a considerable body of literature also exists on discrete data [14, 3] ; in particular some recent work has focussed on graph data relevant to applications in areas such as social networks [11, 2] .
Differentially private mechanisms can be divided into two distinct classes: sanitisation based mechanisms; and output perturbation based mechanisms. Our concern here is with the former class, which first constructs a sanitised version of the database and then answers queries on this. It has been shown in [10] that if the sanitised database satisfies the requirements of differential privacy, then any query can be answered on it in a differentially private manner.
In writing this paper, we have two aims: the first is to present a set of new results on the mathematical foundations of differential privacy for discrete data; the second is to bring the problems in this field to the attention of researchers in discrete applied mathematics.
We examine differentially private mechanisms for discrete data within the general probabilistic framework described in our previous paper [10] . As we deal with finite datasets here, many of the measure-theoretic details required for the more general setting can be suppressed. However, to properly set context, we include the more general definitions here in Section 2.
Our first results concern an adaptation for discrete data of the exponential mechanism introduced by McSherry and Talwar. In particular, we consider the problem of sufficient sets for differential privacy for this mechanism. This problem is motivated by the practical issue of testing whether or not a mechanism is differentially private and arises from the following simple considerations.
For a sanitisation to be differentially private, certain inequalities (described formally later) must hold on all subsets of the database space, which can necessitate checking a prohibitively large collection of sets in order to test for differential privacy. The question of sufficient sets asks whether it is sufficient for the differential privacy condition to hold on a collection of these subsets for it to hold on all subsets. We can therefore reduce the workload required to check that a mechanism satisfies differential privacy. In Section 3, we present results characterising sufficient sets for the discrete exponential mechanism. We then use these to give necessary and sufficient conditions for differential privacy for this mechanism.
A major concern of privacy research is the trade-off between privacy and accuracy. For the current setting, in the absence of a given metric on the dataset, we measure the error of a sanitisation using hamming distance; in Theorem 5 we derive a tight lower bound on the maximal expected error of a discrete exponential mechanism.
In Section 4 we consider a seemingly unrelated approach to database sanitisation: product sanitisations. We show that these are in fact equivalent to the discrete exponential mechanism constructed using the hamming distance and, building on results in [10] , we characterise differential privacy and the error for these in Theorems 8 and 9 respectively. Finally in Theorem 10 we provide a characterisation of the optimal product sanitisation mechanism, which minimises the maximal expected error within the class of product sanitisations (and hence within the class of discrete exponential mechanisms). Concluding remarks are given in Section 5.
Related work
Before the advent of differential privacy, Fienberg examined the use of data swapping and cell supression for privacy protection on categorical data [8] . Dwork then presented the notion of differential privacy in [7] , and it limitations were discussed by Dankar in [4] , including its applicability to categorical data.
Dwork's work was closely followed by McSherry and Talwar who proposed the exponential mechanism in [14] . An instantiation of this was used by Hardt and Talwar [9] in examining the geometry of differential privacy. Mohammed made use of the exponential mechanism for releasing count queries in [15, 3] , while a more recent contribution has looked at differential privacy on counts using a combination of the Laplace and exponential mechanisms [18] .
Preliminaries

Database model
We consider a finite data set D with (m+1) elements (m ≥ 1). A database d with n rows drawn from this data set is represented by a vector
D is equipped with a σ-algebra, in this case the power set 2 D and D n inherits the product σ-algebra, 2 D n . We are therefore considering all subsets of D and D n . We will consider hamming distance on D n . Recall that the hamming distance, h : D n × D n → {0, 1, . . . , n}, between two databases is the number of rows on which they differ:
We say two databases
i.e. they differ on exactly one row.
Query model
We make use of the generalised query model introduced in [10] , adapted to the discrete setting. A query Q : D n → E Q outputs a response in E Q , the structure of which is not specified (it may be numeric, categorical, functional, etc). E Q is, however, equipped with a σ-algebra A Q . We require that all queries be measurable, which is trivial in this setting since
Response mechanism
Let (Ω, F , P) be a probability space. We define a response mechanism for a query Q to be the family of measurable mappings
For simplicity, when the query in question is the identity query I, we denote
Where there is no ambiguity, the response mechanism will be written as {X Q,d } (or {X d } when dealing with the identity query).
In this paper we deal exclusively with sanitised response mechanisms, where
In this case the mechanism is generated by first sanitising the database d and then answering queries on the sanitised database X d without any further modification to the data. Hence, a sanitised response mechanism for a query Q is the family of mappings
One mechanism which we will make use of in this paper is the exponential mechanism, as described by McSherry and Talwar [14] . The following is the exponential mechanism written in our notation, reformulated to deal specifically with discrete data.
Definition 1 (Exponential mechanism) Given a query Q, a query output space E Q , a utility function (which measures the utility of all possible query answers to the database being queried) u : D n ×E Q → R, a measure µ : E Q → R and a normalisation constant C d , the exponential mechanism is defined to be the family of mappings
n }, with probability density function with respect to µ given by C
Comment: If E Q is discrete, we can specify µ by {µ(q) : q ∈ E Q } and the exponential mechanism has probability mass function
where q ∈ E Q .
Differential privacy
We now define what it means for a response mechanism in our framework to be differentially private.
Definition 2 (Differential privacy with respect to a query) Let a query Q : D n → E Q and parameters ǫ ≥ 0 and 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1 be given. A response
Note: McSherry and Talwar showed that the exponential mechanism (Definition 1) satisfies 2ǫ∆u-differential privacy (δ = 0), where
Theorem 4 of [10] simplifies the problem of checking differential privacy for sanitised response mechanisms. We now recall that theorem.
Theorem 1 (Identity query)
A sanitised response mechanism which is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private with respect to the identity query is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private with respect to any query Q.
We therefore need only examine the response mechanism for the identity query, Queries on such databases could include counting the number of unique hobbies (4 in the case above) or how many list 'Television' as their favourite hobby (2 in the case above). The identity query would be another valid query.
Sufficient sets for discrete exponential mechanism
In order for a response mechanism to be deemed (ǫ, δ)-differentially private, (5) must hold for all pairs of neighbouring databases and for all possible subsets of D n . If we were to check all combinations, this would require checking all nm(m + 1) n pairs of neighbouring databases on 2
(all subsets except D n itself and ∅). Therefore, checking a discrete response mechanism for differential privacy requires nm(m + 1) n (2
However, for a given pair of neighbouring databases, it is not always necessary to check (5) on all subsets of D n . So we ask the question: For a given
what is the smallest collection of subsets of D n that we need to check for (5) to hold on all subsets of D n ? We call such a collection of subsets sufficient sets of the mechanism for d ∼ d
′ . In this section, we examine the sufficient sets for a class of discrete response mechanisms and show that, even in the most general cases, significant improvements on workload can be made when checking for differential privacy. We also present conditions that are necessary and sufficient for differential privacy to hold. This compares to the mostly sufficient conditions presented in other differential privacy literature, which can therefore give a conservative estimate on the privacy level achieved.
General response mechanism
We begin by considering the exponential mechanism described by McSherry and Talwar [14] , as detailed in Definition 1. We wish to assign a probability to each database based on its utility to the input/reference database. This is determined by the utility function, which can be a metric or any other function deemed suitable for a particular application. As discussed in Section 2.4, we are only concerning ourselves with the identity query.
Ordinarily, to minimise error, we would want to assign the reference/input database itself the highest probability of being returned, with decreasing likelihood the further we move away from the reference, as determined by the utility function.
Definition 3 (Discrete exponential mechanism) Let u : D n × D n → R be given. The discrete exponential response mechanism is defined to be a family of measurable mappings
where each X d satisfies
Remark: While similar to the exponential mechanism (4), the discrete exponential mechanism differs by dealing only with the identity query (Q = I), by having a uniform measure (µ = 1) and by absorbing ǫ into u, in order to allow consideration of (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy.
Even with this general set-up, we can still make improvements on workload when checking for differential privacy. We begin by defining the following set for each pair of neighbouring databases
This set is a collection of the "worst-case" databases for d and d ′ , and, as we show in Theorem 2, is the only set of interest when checking for differential privacy.
Proof:
Hence, (5) holds on
Since A is finite (D n is finite), this process will eventually terminate when A i = A, i.e. i = |A \ A 0 |. Hence, (5) will hold on A as required.
We now look at a simple example to demonstrate the impact of Theorem 2.
Example 2 (ℓ 1 norm) For this example, we consider a discrete exponential mechanism where D = {0, 1, 2}, n = 2 and u(d, d
In this case, |D n | = 9, and we are therefore required to check 2 9 − 2 = 510 subsets (all subsets of D n except ∅ and D n itself ) for every pair of neighbouring databases 
There are only finitely many such values in α, since S d,d ′ is finite. We label these elements α 1 , α 2 , . . . , α s , with 0
Note that for each i and for all d
We can now show that if (5) holds on these partitions, it will hold on all subsets of each partition, i.e. the partitions are sufficient sets of themselves.
. Since this also holds for the setS
, or, rewriting,
Hence, (5) 
, and so,
Therefore (5) holds on all subsets of S d,d ′ , and by Theorem 2, it holds on all subsets of D n .
Discrete exponential mechanism with hamming distance
The usefulness of Theorem 3 becomes particularly apparent when we restrict our response mechanism to one derived from hamming distance. For the remainder of this section our utility function u is defined to be
where k ≥ 0 is a privacy parameter and h(d, d ′ ) is the hamming distance between d and d ′ (the number of elements on which they differ, see (1)). Note that for this set-up, the normalisation constant
Proposition 1 For a discrete exponential mechanism satisfying (12),
(13) n be given. Then,
For the probability mass function of X d to sum to 1, we need
Rearranging this completes the proof. In this case, the sufficient sets for the problem condense down to a single set.
Corollary 2 (Sufficient sets for hamming distance) Consider a discrete exponential mechanism satisfying (12). If (5) holds on
As U is linear, the set α reduces to a singleton set,
and hence Theorem 2) and also on all subsets of D n (by Theorem 3). We have established that, for the discrete exponential mechanism satisfying (12) and for a given neighbouring pair of databases d ∼ d ′ , to check for differential privacy on all possible subsets of the database space D n , we need only check a single set
It is now a relatively simple task to establish conditions on the response mechanism for differential privacy. For the following theorem, we assume that δ < 1 (note that all mechanisms are trivially (ǫ,1)-differentially private).
Theorem 4 (Condition for differential privacy) Let δ < 1. A discrete exponential mechanism {X d } satisfying (12) is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private if and only if
By Corollary 2 we need only satisfy (5) on S d,d ′ for it to hold on all A ⊆ D n . Hence we need
, therefore the mechanism will be differentially private if and only if
Now consider P(
c m c (c elements must be changed, but not the element on which d and
.
Substituting this result into (15) gives
1 ≤ e ǫ−k + δ 1 + m e k , and solving for e k completes the proof. Remark: For (ǫ,0)-differential privacy, we require k ≤ ǫ. Discussion: If we convert our discrete exponential mechanism back into the form of the exponential mechanism, McSherry and Talwar [14] tell us that the mechanism satisfies 2ǫ-differential privacy at worst. However, we have shown in Theorem 4 that the mechanism satisfies ǫ-differential privacy, and that this condition is tight (necessary and sufficient, hence we can do no better). This improves on the looser bound in McSherry and Talwar's proof, as it underestimates the differential privacy achieved by a factor of two. Their mechanism is also limited to ǫ-differential privacy only (δ = 0), whereas we can account for (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy (δ > 0).
We define the error of a mechanism, E, to be the largest mean hamming distance between the input and sanitised databases:
Using the differential privacy constraints established in Theorem 4, we can now determine error bounds of the mechanism.
Theorem 5 (Error) The error, E, of a discrete exponential mechanism satisfying (12) and which is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private, satisfies
c for all c ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n}. Hence,
On average, the number of entries that will change is therefore
Since the response mechanism is differentially private, Theorem 4 tells us that e k ≤ e ǫ +mδ 1−δ , and k ≥ 0 by definition, hence,
Remark: This lower bound bound is tight and can be achieved by setting k = ln 
Product Sanitisation
The results of Section 3 give a clear framework on how to create differentially private mechanisms for any type of discrete data, particularly categorical data using hamming distance, and to obtain tight (necessary and sufficient) conditions for differential privacy. However, this mechanism requires the creation of a separate probability distribution for each of the (m + 1) n unique databases. In this section, we present a simple method for realising the discrete exponential mechanism.
Response mechanism
A product sanitisation mechanism is one where the database is sanitised row-by-row. The following is the definition of such a mechanism, following the same notation as in [10] .
Definition 4 (Product sanitisation mechanism) Given a 1-dimensional response mechanism for the identity query, {X d : Ω → D | d ∈ D} (the parent mechanism), the product sanitisation response mechanism is defined to be the set of measurable mappings
where the X i d are independent and each X i d has the same distribution as
In this setting, each row of the sanitised database is represented by an independent random variable, as if the database represents n 1-dimensional databases, each sanitised independently. Realising this framework therefore only requires the creation of m + 1 probability distributions which are then copied to create distributions on each database.
We now recall Theorem 5 of [10] , which states that differential privacy on a product sanitisation mechanism is guaranteed when its parent mechanism is differentially private.
Theorem 6 Consider a family {X d | d ∈ D} of measurable mappings and assume that
The converse of this result was proven in Lemma 3 of [10] . However, we are able to take a simpler approach to showing this converse by exploiting the finiteness of D.
Corollary 3 (Parent mechanism)
However, since {X d } is a product sanitisation mechanism,
and A ⊆ D, as required. Hence, for a product sanitisation mechanism to be differentially private, we need only show that its parent mechanism is differentially private.
For the remainder of this section, given 0 ≤ p ≤ 1 m+1 , the parent mechanism {X d | d ∈ D} of the product sanitisation is defined such that
for every d ′ ∈ D \ {d}. Remark: p = 1 m+1 represents the case of releasing uniform noise (i.e. no information), while decreasing p reduces the error of the mechanism.
Remark:
Therefore, the mechanism is at least as likely to return the correct answer as any one incorrect answer, an entirely reasonable assumption. ′ ) = 0.1. We then sanitise the n-row database d in the same way, working through the database one row at a time.
In the first main result of this section, we show that the product sanitisation mechanism and the discrete exponential mechanism are equivalent, despite being constructed in different ways (this is subject to the discrete exponential mechanism satisfying (12) and the product sanitisation mechanism satisfying (19)).
n } be a discrete exponential mechanism satisfying (12) , and
n } be a product sanitisation response mechanism, whose parent mechanism satisfies (19). Then the probability mass functions of X d and Y d are identical, for every d ∈ D n , when
Proof: Let d ∈ D n , then
, for all d ′ ∈ D n . For the two mechanisms to be equivalent, we need p 1−pm = e −k , or, rewriting,
We also need 1 − pm = , which can be rewritten as
Hence, the mechanisms{X d } and
Alternative proofs of Theorems 4 and 5
We have already established that the discrete exponential mechanism satisfying (12) and the product sanitisation mechanism satisfying (19) are equivalent, meaning the results of Theorems 4 and 5 also apply to the product sanitisation mechanism in this particular set-up. In this sub-section, we provide alternative methods of proof for these theorems that make use of the specific product sanitisation of the mechanism, for the additional insight provided.
The proof of the following theorem first appeared in [10] , but is included here for completeness.
Theorem 8 (Condition for differential privacy)
A product sanitisation mechanism, whose parent mechanism satisfies (19), is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private if and only if
Proof: By Corollary 3, we need only be concerned with proving differential privacy on
given. Applying the definition of differential privacy to the singleton set A = {d} gives 1 − pm ≤ e ǫ p + δ.
Rearranging this gives (21).
"⇐": Assume (21) holds and let d = d ′ ∈ D and A ⊆ D be given. There are four cases to consider on A:
From (21), we have
since |A| ≥ 1 (d ∈ A by hypothesis). Rewriting the above, 
We now look at an alternative proof of Theorem 5 which established error bounds on the mechanism.
Theorem 9 (Error) The error, E, of a product sanitisation mechanism, whose parent mechanism satisfies (19) and is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private, satisfies
As the mechanism satisfies (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy, p ≥ Remark: As with the discrete exponential mechanism, this bound is tight and can be achieved by setting p equal to the lower bound established in Theorem 8.
Optimal mechanism
We now look at the second main result of this section. Using the same error definition as before, (16), we show how to construct the optimal (ǫ, δ)-differentially private mechanism which produces the minimum error. For the purpose of this subsection, we assume the following labelling of elements in the data set:
Definition 5 (Solution Matrix) The parent mechanism {X d } of a product sanitisation mechanism can be defined by a stochastic matrix
where
We refer to P (ǫ,δ) as a product sanitisation solution matrix if the mechanism it defines is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private.
Remark: A parent mechanism which satisfies (19) is represented by the following solution matrix:
Theorem 10 (Optimality) Let {X d } be a parent mechanism which satisfies (19), with p = 1−δ e ǫ +m . The error, E = max d∈D n E[h(X d , d)], produced by its product sanitisation mechanism {X d } is the minimum of all product sanitisation mechanisms.
Proof: Let A = P (ǫ,δ) , satisfying (25) with p = 1−δ e ǫ +m , be the solution matrix of {X d }, i.e. P(Xd i =d j ) = a ij . Note that this mechanism has the property that a jj = e ǫ a ij + δ, since a jj = e ǫ +mδ e ǫ +m and a ij = 1−δ e ǫ +m , for all i = j. The error of its product sanitisation mechanism {X d }, using the same method as in the proof of Theorem 9, is
for all i, since a ii = a jj = 1 − mp for all i and j.
Let B be a solution matrix defining the parent mechanism {Y d }, with a corresponding product sanitisation mechanism {Y d }, where B = A. Since B is a solution matrix, it is stochastic ( j b ij = 1 for all i) and the parent mechanism it defines is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private (P(Y d ∈ A) ≤ e ǫ P(Y d ′ ∈ A) + δ, for all d, d
′ ∈ D and A ⊆ D). Since A = B and A, B are stochastic, there exists at least one pair (i * , j * ), where b i * j * < a i * j * . There are two cases to consider:
2. i * = j * : As noted previously, a j * j * = e ǫ a i * j * + δ, and since {Y d } is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private, P(Y d j * = d j * ) ≤ e ǫ P(Y d i * = d j * )+δ, or alternatively, b j * j * ≤ e ǫ b i * j * + δ. Therefore, b j * j * ≤ e ǫ b i * j * + δ < e ǫ a i * j * + δ = a j * j * .
Hence, b j * j * < a j * j * , and case 1 applies.
We therefore conclude that
and that {X d } is the product sanitisation mechanism which produces the optimal error. Using Theorem 10, we now have a simple method to construct the most accurate (ǫ, δ)-differentially private mechanism possible for discrete data. We have proven that no other product sanitisation mechanism is more accurate than it. It follows from Theorem 7 that we now know the optimal discrete exponential mechanism that satisfies (12).
Conclusion
We study mechanisms for (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy on finite datasets that are an adaptation for discrete data of the exponential mechanism introduced by McSherry and Talwar. By deriving sufficient sets for differential privacy we obtain necessary and sufficient conditions for differential privacy, a tight lower bound on the maximal expected error of a discrete mechanism and a characterisation of the optimal mechanism which minimises the maximal expected error within the class of mechanisms considered.
